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Population ageing: the timebomb that isn’t?
Jeroen Spijker and John MacInnes argue that current measures of population ageing are misleading
and that the numbers of dependent older people in the UK and other countries have actually been
falling in recent years
Jeroen Spijker senior research fellow 1 2, John MacInnes professor 1
1School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8 9LD, UK ; 2Centre d’Estudis Demogràfics, Barcelona, Spain
Population ageing is a concern in all developed countries. For
the first time, there are now more people over the age of 65 in
the United Kingdom than there are children under 15 years.1
Over the past century, the proportion of over 65s has grown
from about one in 20 to around one in six. Although declining
birth rates and infant mortality formed the basis for this growth
from the end of the 19th century until the second world war,
since the 1970s increasing life expectancy has been an additional
driving force (fig 1⇓). This population ageing has worried policy
makers because for every worker paying tax and national
insurance there are more older citizens, who make greater
demands on social insurance, health, and welfare systems and
have increasing morbidity and disability.2-4
The standard indicator of population ageing is the old age
dependency ratio. It takes the number of people who have
reached the state pension age and divides it by the number of
working age (16-64 years) adults in order to estimate the
proportion of older people relative to those who pay for them.
Although the phased raising of the state pension age (from 65
for men and 60 for women) to 68 for both sexes, which will
keep 3.5 million people in the working age, will initially cause
the ratio to decline from today’s 31% in England and Wales,
by 2035 it will have risen to 37%.
However, the old age dependency ratio is a poor measure of the
burden of an ageing population. It counts neither the number
of dependent older people nor the number who sustain them. It
merely takes a cut-off point (the state pension age) and assigns
adults to the two sides of the ratio accordingly. This might be
a useful rule of thumb if the relative size of these two age groups
tracked the volume of old age dependency, but it does not. We
propose an alternative measure that gives a more accurate and
very different picture and consider the implications of our results
for health policy.
Counting dependent older people
Since the main factor behind the ageing population is increasing
life expectancy, age is a poor measure of its burden. In 1900
mean life expectancy for a 65 year old woman in England and
Wales was 11 years. Today she could expect to live another 21
years (10 and 18 years respectively for men). We can best
capture this changing importance of age by realising that the
age of a population comprises two components: the years lived
of its members (their ages) and their years left (remaining life
expectancies).
In a period of lengthening lifespans, not only does the average
age of the population increase, so too does the remaining life
expectancy associated with each age.5 This has substantial
effects. The median age of the population did not climb above
25 until the start of the last century, since when it has risen to
40. Life expectancy has also increased across this period, so
that although the median age of 24 in 1900 carried a life
expectancy of 39 more years, those at the median age of 40 in
2009 could expect to live a further 42 years. In aggregate terms,
the population of 2009, despite being much older as measured
by years lived, was nevertheless younger than that of 1900 in
terms of years left. This is crucial, because many behaviours
and attitudes (including those related to health) are more strongly
linked to remaining life expectancy than to age.6-8
The old age dependency ratio defines all people above the
statutory pension age as dependent, regardless of their economic,
social, or medical circumstances. This overlooks the fact that
rising life expectancy makes these older people “younger,”
healthier, and fitter than their peers in earlier cohorts. Many
have accumulated substantial assets. Currently over one million
are still working, mostly part time, many with valuable
experience or specialist knowledge. The spending power of the
“grey pound” has risen inexorably. Many do volunteer work
vital to the third sector or look after grandchildren. We know
that most acute medical care costs occur in the final months of
life, with the age at which these months occur having little
effect.9 10 At least some forms of disability are being postponed
to later ages. Good data on population health by age are available
only for the last decade, but remaining life expectancy data are
a robust substitute because they provide a more accurate picture
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of the extent of ageing. Therefore, following Sanderson and
Scherbov and others5 10-14 we use a remaining life expectancy
of ≤ 15 years as the threshold of dependency in our calculations,
rather than a fixed age boundary, and do so for each sex
separately.
Counting the working population
The old age dependency ratio assumes that everyone of working
age actually works. However, the knowledge economy keeps
young people in education for longer while many older workers
choose or are obliged to retire early. Meanwhile, greater sex
equality and dual career families have added fivemillion women
workers to the British labour market over the past 50 years.
Using age to define the working population thus makes little
sense. Indeed, if we count people who are not employed, for
whatever reason, as dependent we find that there are more
dependents of working age (9.5 million) than there are older
people who do not work. We therefore use the number actually
employed, irrespective of age, for the denominator in our
calculation.
Different picture of ageing
According to the standard old age dependency ratio, for every
person aged ≥65 there were 7-8 adults of working age (15-64)
until about 1910 (fig 2⇓). The ratio subsequently increased
almost linearly until about 1980, when there were just under
four adults of working age for every older person. These data
underpin the population ageing debate, which typically
concludes that the increasing burden of elder dependency will
strain health and social care systems, limit the aspirations of
universal healthcare, and require raising the state pension age
to limit the costs to the welfare state.
However, if we define the dependent older population as people
with a remaining life expectancy of ≤15 years, the trend is
different. Figure 2⇓ shows that from the late 1970s
improvements in old age mortality have reversed the rise in the
proportion of the population with low life expectancies.
We can now add in the trend in employment, where later entry
to employment, and earlier exit from it, has been more than
offset by the large rise in employment among mothers, so that
the proportion of the entire population who are at work is similar
now (48%) to what it was 60 years ago (46%).15 We calculated
what we call the real elderly dependency ratio as the sum of
men and women with a remaining life expectancy ≤15 years
divided by the number of people in employment. When we use
this as a measure, dependency has fallen by one third over the
past four decades (fig 3⇓). Looking into the future, the old age
dependency ratio will continue to rise, even if we adjust for the
planned changes in the state pension age. However, the real
elderly dependency ratio is set to fall further, stabilise for several
years then gradually increase, although at no point through to
2050 will it regain the levels experienced for most of the last
century. Moreover, our projection is a conservative one, since
we have held employment rates constant over time, when they
are likely to increase because of the rise in the state pension
age, disincentives to early retirement, and further progress on
sex equality. It is thus probable that our ratio will stabilise near
its current level.
International comparisons
Figure 4⇓ shows how our new measure and the conventional
old age dependency ratio compare over the past half century
for several countries. While the old age dependency ratio rises
substantially everywhere, the real elderly dependency ratio falls
in most countries. In Germany and Italy the real elderly
dependency ratio has been almost flat for two decades because
of slower growth in employment and lower birth rates than in
other countries. Immigration has played an important role in
depressing the real elderly dependency ratio by raising
employment rates. Conversely Japan, with relatively low birth
rates, immigration, and female labour force participation, has
seen its ratio rise rapidly. Latest available data show that only
the US had a lower ratio than the UK, but the UK is observing
a faster rate of decline.
Implications for health policy and practice
The different story of population ageing told by our real elderly
dependency ratio has several important implications for health
policy and clinical practice. We should not assume that
population ageing itself will strain health and social care
systems. Demand for services will rise but continue to be driven
by other factors, chiefly progress in medical knowledge and
technology, but also the increasing complexity of comorbid age
related conditions. However, as others have suggested, the
economic costs of old age dependency have typically been
exaggerated, especially in the UK.16 17 Our calculations show
that over the past four decades the population, far from ageing,
has in fact been getting younger, with increasing numbers of
people in work for every older person or child.
Medical staff will need to stay alert to the changing relation
between “old” and “age” as life expectancy continues to increase
and the typical onset of senescence and its associatedmorbidities
is delayed.9 18 19 Sixty may not quite be the new 40, but
expectations formed by aspiring doctors and nurses in medical
school about age and morbidity or the likely health of older
patients may become rapidly out of date.
More attention will need to be paid to the dynamic relation
betweenmorbidity and remaining life expectancy. Age specific
disability rates seem to be falling,9 20 21 yet recently born
generations have a worse risk factor profile than older ones. For
example, current obesity trends may have a big effect on public
health through related diseases such as diabetes. Ageing related
diseases like osteoarthritis are predicted to increase and start at
a younger age. This may not only result in an increased risk of
cardiovascular and other chronic diseases, it also suggests that
the ageing process can speed up as well as slow down, with
obvious implications for public health policy.
We urgently need to understand the well established positive
association between education and health in the context of the
expansion of tertiary education since the late 1960s. It is not
clear whether the improvements in adult health are an
independent effect of education or a result of confounding by
factors such as social class. If the effect is independent, we can
expect a substantial education dividend to improve mortality
andmorbidity rates in the decades to come, which in turn should
depress the real elderly dependency ratio.
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Key messages
The extent, speed, and effect of population ageing have been exaggerated because the standard indicator—the old age dependency
ratio—does not take account of falling mortality
When measured using remaining life expectancy, old age dependency turns out to have fallen substantially in the UK and elsewhere
over recent decades and is likely to stabilise in the UK close to its current level
The capacity of healthcare systems to cope with increasing longevity will depend on the changing relationship between morbidity and
remaining life expectancy and, in particular, the effect of education
Competing interests: We have read and understood the BMJ policy on
declaration of interests and have no relevant interests to declare.
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Figures
Fig 1Change in life expectancy (in years) in England andWales within each decade broken down by age group, 1950-2010
(data from www.mortality.org). Life expectancy increased by 2.6 years between 2000 and 2010, 0.1 years of which came
from improved infant and child survival and, respectively 0.5 and 2.0 years from lower mortality among 5-64 and ≥65 year
olds
Fig 2 Proportion of the population aged ≥65, proportion of the population at ages with remaining life expectancy of ≤15
years, and the old age dependency ratio, England and Wales 1900-2011 (see appendix on bmj.com for calculations)
Fig 3 Old age dependency ratios, proportion of the population at ages with remaining life expectancy of ≤15 years, and the
real elderly dependency ratio, England andWales 1950-2050 (data fromwww.mortality.org and England andWales censuses
(www.ons.gov.uk)). See appendix on bmj.com for details of calculations
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Fig 4 Real elderly dependency ratio and old age dependency ratios in various countries, 1950-2010 (data from
www.mortality.org and http://stats.oecd.org)
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